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**UNITED STATES POLICY ON TERRORIST USE OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)**

BY

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by

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ABSTRACT

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The threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies has significantly increased since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989. The U.S. has yet to come to grips with the strategic implications this places on its national security strategy and what this means on how we fight wars and what is considered war. Terrorist use of WMD may be the most significant threat the U.S. faces in the near future. We need to develop a cohesive policy and ensure that resources are dedicated to combatting this issue.

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United States Policy on Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

“Today, there is no greater threat to our nation’s, or the world’s, national security than the illicit spread of weapons of mass destruction.”¹

The United States is facing an unparalleled threat from inimical groups possessing a current or future capability to use Weapons of Mass Destruction and having the desire and the will to cause massive damage to the U.S. and its interests. This terrorist use of WMD is of such significance that the United States must develop a comprehensive policy to counter the threat. However, in many ways, the United States continues to address the solution to this problem in a cold war fashion and is not adapting to the changes in warfare engendered in the latter part of this century.

NATURE OF THE THREAT

Weapons of mass destruction are those weapons which cause massive destruction and/or loss of life with results that belie their size and ease of use. Weapons of this type comprise either nuclear, biological or chemical agents and as such require extreme vigilance in preventing their illicit use by terrorist or irrational nations. In 1995, it was speculated that changes occurring in the international environment coupled with the availability of advanced technology could have serious ramifications for future terrorist operations internationally and domestically.² Terrorists may “cross the threshold to engage in acts of mass or “super terrorism” by using atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) weapons.”³ On 20 March 1995, this prophecy came true in Tokyo.

A small, sophisticated atomic device, weighing between 100 to 300 pounds or a crude device weighing approximately a ton could have a yield of up to 10 kilotons.⁴ The bomb dropped at Hiroshima was 15 KT,⁵ and it destroyed everything within 1 mile of the detonation.⁶ An even easier device to construct is a conventional bomb surrounded by radioactive material. If the bomb used at the World Trade Center had been laced with “cobalt-60 or iodine-131 (both commonly available in medical and industrial laboratories), New York’s financial district could have been rendered uninhabitable for generations.”⁷

One hundred kilograms of anthrax spores distributed by an efficient aerosol container over Washington DC would kill one million to three million people.⁸ Gruinard Island, which lies off the coast of Scotland and was a testing ground for biological weapons in WW II, remains uninhabitable today. Initially used as a test site for Great Britain’s nascent BW program involving anthrax spores to counter German and Japanese advantages in this area of warfare, the island was considered far enough from the mainland for safety and easily decontaminated in the future. However, testing ceased when livestock along the shore of Scotland began dying from anthrax, and the attempt to decontaminate the island by burning failed when “the spores unexpectedly embedded themselves in the soil. Total decontamination of the island was/is impossible.”⁹

We have already seen the results of a chemical agent released in a crowded subway system in Tokyo, on 20 March 1995, by the fanatic, cultist group, Aum Shinrikyo, killing 12 and leaving 3,807 seriously injured.”¹⁰ Hospital emergency rooms were flooded with over 5500 people who required treatment from this attack.¹¹ The Aum had developed their own nerve agents by legitimately buying the necessary equipment and material to manufacture chemical agents.¹² Lesser known but equally horrifying was the discovery that Aum had: plans to spray sarin gas from a helicopter over Tokyo which would have killed thousands; schemed to acquire

nuclear weapons and the ability to produce biological weapons; had mined for uranium in Australia; and had planned to spray LSD over Tokyo to paralyze the government and establish a theocracy in Japan.¹³

WORLD ENVIRONMENT: WW II - 1989

From the end of WW II through most of 1989, the bipolar world was essentially a stable environment. For the most part, enemies and their goals were known and understood. The U.S. and the USSR, each with their allies, competed against each other, often through surrogates. This bilateral division of interests led to confrontation, but brinkmanship halted at the point where all out war might ensue because the world was dominated by rational actors who understood the effects of nuclear/total war. Not so today and in the future.

CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

“Tomorrow’s most dangerous terrorist will be motivated not by political ideology, but by fierce ethnic and religious hatreds. Their goal will not be political control, but the utter destruction of their chosen enemies....they will be joined by another variety of terrorist—criminals.”¹⁴

Subversives, terrorists and transnational crime are all threats that must be addressed in a policy countering terrorist use of WMD. “Before the 1990s are over, we will be forced to recognize that it is the method, not the motive, that makes a terrorist.”¹⁵ The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the capability to devise them and methods to deliver them are becoming readily available to organizations whose interests are hostile to the U.S. Cultist groups such as the Aum have no compunction killing thousands to promote their ideology. And while “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction does not mean that most terrorist groups are likely to use them in the foreseeable future, ... some almost certainly will.”¹⁶

A number of analysts think that a WMD attack of some type will probably occur within the next 10 years in the U.S.¹⁷ This is particularly frightening when the Director of the CIA has publicly stated that “chemical and biological weapons are the “weapons of choice” for terrorists.”¹⁸ The ease of obtaining biological weapons defies all logic. “Saddam Hussein bought his original anthrax culture from a mail order house in the United States and had it shipped overnight mail!”¹⁹ Even the technical knowledge and equipment is relatively easy to acquire, especially when much of it has a dual use capability—for both military and civilian application.²⁰

The best counterterrorist organizations in the world—e.g., British, Israeli and of course American—can not absolutely guarantee the prevention of terrorist attacks one hundred percent. The magnitude of the problem is considerable. A case in point, is that even as the U.S. was investigating the Khobar Towers bombing and extolling the British system of security to protect their personnel and posts,²¹ on 7 October 1996, (the same day that General Downing, former CINCSOC, and the investigating officer in the Khobar Towers incident was briefing the 1997 Army War College Class on this incident) a devastating terrorist, attack occurred in Thiepval Barracks, the main camp for the 18,000 army troops in the British-ruled province. Thiepval was considered to be the most untouchable British post in Northern Ireland.²²

It is not war as we normally think of it that threatens the American way of life today. In fact, there is less chance of a global nuclear war today than there has been in the past 30 years.²³ This threat is relegated to the terrorist use of WMD. It is especially the threat of the small, fanatical group that, whether it has a religious, ethnic or ideological orientation decides the only way to achieve its goals is to use WMD. It could even be a fringe element of a legitimate political action group, or a criminal organization.²⁴ These groups often act irrationally and unpredictably and will cause the U.S. and its allies the greatest problems.

Examples are numerous:

- “In 1984, two groups of Israeli fanatics plotted to blow up Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock, Islam’s third holiest shrine, in hope of igniting a final battle between Moslems and Jews.”²⁵
- “Fourteen white supremacists met...in Mountain Home, Arkansas, in 1984 where they plotted to poison reservoirs in Chicago, Illinois, and Washington, DC, and began stockpiling 30 gallons of cyanide.”²⁶
- Aum Shinrikyo sent a “sect medical team to Zaire in 1992 to investigate a big disease with a little name—Ebola,”²⁷ for use against their enemies.
- Again in Japan, in May 1995, an attempted release of hydrocyanic gas occurred at Shinjuku Station, which would have killed thousands, and was prevented only minutes before it was to occur.²⁸
- Even as this paper is written, acts of terrorism are taking place in the Mid-East and the United States—Hamas’ bombing of an outdoor café in Tel Aviv, the killing of 7 Israeli school children on the Island of Peace in Jordan, and the abortion clinic bombings in Atlanta.²⁹

The world changed in 1989 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. We no longer live in a bi-polar world but rather a multi-polar or uni-polar environment with the U.S. the sole remaining super power. We have yet to reconcile the significance of that change and how it affects the U.S. National Security Strategy. However, “there is broad consensus that WMD proliferation is now, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the top threat to U.S. national security.”³⁰

TERRORISM, WMD & POLICY

Terrorism: “The substate application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents, and to

*bring about political change. It shades on occasion into guerrilla warfare and even a substitute for war between states.*³¹

The U.S. is at a watershed in history today. With the demise of the Soviet Union, there is no significant threat to the survival of the United States. No country or alliance exists today that can successfully challenge the U.S. in a conventional manner. No country inimical to the United States possesses the ability to project the kind of power that can affect our vital interests; or possesses weapon systems capable of significantly harming the U.S. even if they could project power; or they are allies or democracies—that supposedly don't make war on each other.³²

There is a threat to the American way of life, however, and it is WMD.

The U.S. will do everything possible to preclude an attack by WMD from taking place in the country or against its citizens overseas. It must be recognized that, given past history, somewhere, somehow, someone will probably succeed. The U.S. is an inviting target. In the new threat environment, “a wide variety of sub-national and transnational groups may vent their frustrations with Washington for what they perceive to be a lack of support for their causes or conversely, for supporting their adversaries.”³³

The U.S. has a technological advantage over the other nations of the world.³⁴ For another country to develop a war fighting capability comparable to that of the U.S. the cost would be prohibitive. Witness the billions of dollars the U.S. spent to maintain its superiority during the cold war. The Soviet Union collapsed because of: a rigid “command economy,” imposed by Stalin during the 1930s, which did not reward productivity and initiative; and the “extraordinary burden defense spending placed on the Soviet people,”³⁵ in its attempt to keep up with the U.S. and maintain a viable economy at the same time.³⁶

Current policy as promulgated in "The National Security Strategy," dated February 1996, states that "a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats...[while retaining] the capacity to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction so that the costs of such will be seen as outweighing the gains."³⁷ Of course, retaliation may be of little significance, if thousands or perhaps hundreds of thousands are already dead. The international community, official and unofficial, sub-national and transnational, must be aware of the import of the use of these weapons and the consequences of their use against the U.S., its allies, and its interests. There should be no lingering doubts on the U.S. response against the perpetrators, their organization, and their supporters in the wake of WMD usage. The implication is then implicit that we must have a credible deterrent, and one that everyone understands that the U.S. will use.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) states that we will work with our allies, and unilaterally, to counter terrorism.³⁸ It further proclaims that we will maintain and strengthen our defensive capabilities, retain a credible retaliatory capability, continue to counter proliferation and improve our capability to operate in nuclear, biological, and chemical environments.³⁹ While these last are worthy goals, it appears, at least superficially, that the United States is still oriented towards a cold war strategy of protecting forces on a conventional battlefield and is not taking into consideration the change in warfare that has occurred in the latter part of this century. Its focus is directed without the U.S. It does address the fact that an event that may be the most serious threat to the American way of life may occur within the country. How we think of the military and its uses may require dramatic changes in the coming years.

The nature of war is changing. The extreme transnational or domestic threats that are likely to threaten the fabric of American life must be addressed before they culminate in incidents similar to but deadlier than the Oklahoma City Bombing, the World Trade Center bombing, or the Aum Shinrikyo chemical attack. “Terrorism is becoming the substitute for the great wars of the 1800s and early 1900s.”⁴⁰ Terrorism is a form of warfare and needs to be recognized as such.

Senior leaders and policy makers must understand these changes, focusing the U.S. strength and energy to defeat the new threats while still maintaining a capability to protect the U.S. and its allies from other world powers, bent on hegemony, now and in the future. The U.S. must ensure its “defense strategy and military forces are flexible and capable of quickly evolving to meet any new threats”⁴¹ and dedicate the resources necessary to maintain its role as a world power.⁴²

In April, 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) published a DOD strategy, “Proliferation: Threat and Response.” This document provides a trifurcated strategy to protect the U.S. from Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reduction, Deterrence and Defense.⁴³ It begins to delineate, in straight forward terms, what the United States will do if confronted with an enemy’s use of WMD. While this response needs to be more fully developed, it does recognize that this is quite possibly the most significant threat the U.S. and its allies will face in the upcoming years. At least, one high level military figure has unofficially stated that the U.S. has no counterterrorist strategy and that one needs to be implemented.

The U.S. policy must be stronger, and the National Military Strategy (NMS) needs to more fully support the NSS and the published DOD strategy. A more powerful strategy should address: prevention, detection, protection, recovery-after an attack (decontamination, medical

support/treatment, etc.) and response—that is, a specific U.S. response to terrorist use of WMD against a U.S. target.

As of April 1996, the U.S. was still terribly unprepared in the event of domestic, terrorist use of WMD.⁴⁴

CONSEQUENCES OF A SUCCESSFUL TERRORIST WMD ATTACK

If an incident involving WMD occurred in the U.S., the resultant effect would be catastrophic. A successful attack could kill tens of thousands of people, injure many more, devastate the immediate area and contaminate the surrounding land leaving it uninhabitable for decades. Our small number of forces trained to handle such an emergency would be overwhelmed. If the incident were nuclear, the only hospital with the proper facilities is the Methodist Medical Center in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Its ER—the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center (REAC), is the only one in the country dedicated to radiation treatment.⁴⁵

Second and third order effects could be the erosion of the morale of the American people and its detrimental effect on the American life style. In Japan, for months after the Aum Shinrikyo gas attack, the Tokyo population remained traumatized and fearful.⁴⁶ Residents of Tokyo feared to travel by public transportation within the city and when they did, they remained wary of their fellow passengers, unfamiliar packages and peculiar odors.⁴⁷

The civil liberties taken for granted in the U.S. today are probably going to undergo severe modification following a successful attack. After the Aum attack in Japan, suspected cult members were stopped for “suspicion of riding a stolen bicycle.”⁴⁸ The Japanese prepared to enact “the draconian Antisubversive Activities Law... (that had) never before (been) applied to an organization.”⁴⁹ If applied, this would dissolve the Aum, seize their assets, make all ex-members subject to surveillance and make illegal all Aum gatherings.⁵⁰

But by far, the worst consequence of a successful attack might be the attendant inspiration for others to attempt the same feat.

FORCE STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERING TERRORIST USE OF WMD

Current Forces

Currently the U.S. has two overt organizations that are organized and trained to deal with the effects of WMD: The Department of Energy's (DOE) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) and the Army's Technical Escort Unit (TEU). Additionally, the U.S. has the resources to develop additional containment capabilities, special training facilities, specially trained units, triage capabilities, and other response forces.

The NEST was organized in the early 1970s and has been called out on numerous occasions. Special equipment and training enable it to "see" inside containers and determine if there is an explosive device and if it is nuclear. With only a \$70 million dollar budget, over 95 percent of the team members are volunteers who do not get paid for their services.⁵¹ In general, their regular jobs "are mostly connected with the DOE nuclear weapon complex. They're already DOE employees,...or contractors to DOE who volunteer their expertise."⁵²

The TEU is a 150 man unit, organized to counter chemical and biological weapons incidents. Detachments are located in Maryland, Arkansas and Utah. At this time, only the TEU has the organization, training and equipment to contain CB incidents, and is ready to respond on 4 hours notice to an incident anywhere in the world. While the FBI is responsible for responding to domestic WMD terrorist incidents, the TEU will become immediately involved. To activate the TEU for a domestic incident, an official request would originate with local/state authorities then forward through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National

Response Center, DOD and down to the TEU. A somewhat torturous routing that should be streamlined.⁵³

As well trained as the NEST and TEU are, neither is trained to do more than "detect, contain, limit damage and clean up after an attack."⁵⁴ In the past, they have not regularly trained with the special security, medical, investigative agencies or other response teams that would be called in response to a terrorist WMD attack.⁵⁵

Thirteen different organizations collect intelligence at the national level,⁵⁶ yet there is no centralized coordination center to collate this data. This center should be the repository for all intelligence, strategy development and the command and control center for counterterrorist activities. A key part of its mission should be to eliminate duplication of effort and development of plans.

Future Considerations

Because the U.S. has no "near peer" competitor today, nor is there one on the near horizon, senior leadership and policy makers need to determine what military force structure is genuinely required to provide for the continued security of the U.S today and henceforth. An initiative is especially pertinent today if we continue to maintain our nuclear and chemical capability and do not proscribe against the use of these weapons. Only these weapons, because of their destructive power, can adequately substitute for a large, standing military force in the event of a global war or the appearance of an inimical peer competitor. The use of these weapons may appear horrific,⁵⁷ but like the genie that cannot be put back in the bottle, these weapons cannot be made to disappear.

COMBATTING THE WMD TERRORIST THREAT

Due to the nature of the WMD threat, standard methods of combatting terrorism will not provide the predictive capability required to prevent these deadly attacks from occurring. While attempting to predict terrorist activity can be likened to predicting the weather, a tool that may have some utility is “Chaos theory.”⁵⁸ Chaos theory, “studies systems behaving unpredictably and randomly despite their seeming simplicity and the fact that forces involved are supposedly governed by well-understood physical laws.”⁵⁹ While the theory has been around for 30 years, only with the development of high speed computers has it moved into the realm of practicality. It was developed to handle nonlinear interdependent systems and has been used to study mood fluctuations in psychology, patterns of innovation in organizations, traffic flow during peak travel hours, and in developing economic models for stock market fluctuations.⁶⁰

Psychological Requirements

Every attempt should be made to understand the changing motivations and goals of terrorist groups. In addition to the traditional ethnic, religious and political groups, extremists within issue oriented movements such as “radical environmentalism, fringe elements of the pro-life movement, or animal rights groups may arise.”⁶¹ Some radical religious groups may perhaps be the most dangerous. Their willingness to act, and their narrow perspective mark them as extremely dangerous because they lack concern for public opinion and the constraints it places on more traditional terrorist organizations.⁶² These organizations must be studied and understood lest we be caught unawares.

Political Measures

Various treaties, agreements, conventions and meetings abound. (The Geneva Protocol banning biological weapons; the Biological Warfare Convention (BWC) of 1975; establishment

of the Australia Group in 1984; trilateral arrangements between the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom)⁶³ All have exemplary goals. However, even the highest moral objectives cannot be achieved without establishing the means to enforce compliance with the restrictions agreed upon in the various agreements. Rogue states may act contrary to signed agreements.⁶⁴ Iraq was a member of the BWC,⁶⁵ but recent history showed that the Iraqis possessed over 20,000 liters of botulinum toxin and anthrax.⁶⁶ Even the many countries that are signatories to counterproliferation agreements, including the U.S., cannot agree on inspection procedures and compliance measures.⁶⁷

Other problems exist in developing workable agreements. Although the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed by 160 countries, it required ratification by 65 countries. As of March 1996, only 47 had ratified it.⁶⁸

The 1997 Defense Authorization Act provides for a National Coordinator in the NSC. The Coordinators responsibilities will be to coordinate a comprehensive strategy and keep high level visibility on the overall problem with the proliferation of WMD.⁶⁹ This position is long past due.

Terrorist acts have already lost their protection from intervention and investigation as political acts and are now considered criminal acts.⁷⁰ The antecedent was established in 1984 that terrorist acts are not political but can be treated as criminal acts. This freed INTERPOL from the restrictions placed upon it under Article 3 of its charter which prohibits it from investigating military, political, religious or racial incidents. Since then their counterterrorism contribution has been significant.⁷¹ An additional evolutionary step is required. Special provisions should be made to treat terrorist use of WMD as an act of war.

At the strategic political level, the U.S. can undertake numerous actions to counter terrorist use of WMD. The U.S. uses a variety of options to counter “backlash states,” rogue states like Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya.⁷² “As the sole superpower, the United States has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community.”⁷³ Many of the efforts ongoing to contain these rogue states are transferable to the extremely dangerous world of the terrorist. Building and maintaining strong alliances or bilateral agreements, restricting the influence of states that sponsor terrorism, and responding with appropriate military force are measures that are effective and workable.

The policy of dual containment in the Mid-East, where Iran and Iraq remain the major threats to American interests, is a recognition of the altered regional environment due to the fall of the Shah of Iran, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the resultant triumph of coalition forces over Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Both Iran and Iraq have an avowed interest in destroying the U.S., both support international terrorism, and both are trying to develop WMD. But the decline of the Soviet Union eliminated the Soviets as a threat to American interests in this vital region and decreased the strategic importance of Iran and Iraq and the concomitant requirement to support one or the other to contain the Soviets. Instead, the U.S., in conjunction with its regional allies, seeks to maintain a favorable balance of power through strong political, economic and military agreements. Since Iran’s invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf Cooperation States have been more willing to enter into agreements with the U.S. on forward basing of military equipment and preparation for rapid response from the U.S.⁷⁴

Nonproliferation

“Those who voluntarily put power into the hands of a tyrant or an enemy, must not wonder it be at last turned against themselves.” Aesop (620-560 B.C.)

While it may appear beneficial in the short term to sell weapons or technology that provides a WMD capability, it is short sighted and potentially disastrous. The former Soviet Union (FSU), because of its dire economic straits, is particularly susceptible to the attraction of selling WMD technology to rogue states desiring this capability, such as Iran or Iraq. Foreign aid to the embattled FSU will be critical in containing the spread of Soviet WMD capabilities.⁷⁵ Already numerous, smuggling incidents of WMD materials have occurred, and it is reported that Soviet scientists are willing to work for others provided they are adequately recompensed.⁷⁶

Economic Considerations—Domestic & Foreign

Economic pressures exerted by the U.S. are generally unilateral and primarily symbolic in nature.⁷⁷ Many other countries have significant ties and economic requirements which require them to conduct business with countries such as Libya, Iraq, or Iran. While the U.S. can withhold economic aid and impose sanctions, it must be understood that in the prosecution of these adverse policies, we also affect our economic growth and such actions must be considered in context with the overall U.S. national strategy.

In addition, while suing for damage reparations may sound farcical, this is actually occurring today for Iraqi environmental damages Kuwait incurred during the Gulf War. If required to make remuneration, some states would collapse, so this example may also serve as a deterrent.

Military Activities

The trite phrase, "Do more with less," comes to mind when reviewing declining budgets and force structures and contrasting them with increasing requirements. The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the unenviable position of having to prepare for everything and having to do it with less. One thing is for certain, however, terrorists have already used WMD, and this threat must have a high priority in all future security planning measures.

DOD has established a special office on the Joint Staff to coordinate all activities dealing with antiterrorism and WMD use. DoD Directive Number 2000.12, dated September 15, 1996, SUBJECT: DoD Combating Terrorism Program, covers this issue. This document, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense Memorandum, SUBJECT: Department of Defense Responsibilities for Force Protection, dated 15 Sep 96, assigns to the CJCS the position of "the principal advisor and focal point responsible to the Secretary of Defense for all Department of Defense force protection issues."⁷⁸ At the Joint Staff level, the U.S. military established a new directorate—J-34—for Force Protection under the direction of an general officer. Following the Khobar Tower bombing, this new office has the responsibility of coordinating all actions with respect to force protection considerations for military activities worldwide.⁷⁹

THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE

*"If there is a "fog of war," there is probably a more dense "smog of terrorism," for the small nature of terrorist groups, their close interpersonal communications, and their predilection for soft targets of opportunity make it difficult to predict their future operations."*⁸⁰

The U.S. essentially dismantled its HUMINT organization in the late 70s.⁸¹ And while our technical intelligence is perhaps the best in the world,⁸² it may only suffice for a conventional type of war. The ability to determine the who, what, when, and where in terrorist activities

requires extensive human intelligence. HUMINT sources are often the quickest and only way to learn what a terrorist organization is attempting to do. Senator Nunn stated in Senate hearings on 13 March 1996, that examples exist—to include a letter obtained from a Hong Kong company, and found in the Middle East—indicating there are many qualified weapons experts extant who are “willing to work in a country which needs their skills and can offer a reasonable pay.”⁸³

The difficulty lies in developing reliable HUMINT sources. Many terrorist organizations are close knit organizations that do not readily accept new, unknown, and/or unproven members. Becoming a proven member may involve unacceptable acts thus making it difficult to penetrate these organizations. An option is to develop sources on the fringes of terrorist organizations. It is far easier to develop these who can provide “indications,” if not actual facts.⁸⁴

Two separate reports—one after the Beirut bombing in 1983, that killed 241 Marines and the other after the Khobar Towers incident in Dhahran that killed 19 in June last year—have concluded that “terrorism is an undeclared war against the United States and countering it ought to be a key part of military planning.”⁸⁵ Part of the solution is the development of more accurate, real-time intelligence capabilities. The U.S. must focus on the most relevant threats in the turbulent times now and in the foreseeable future. Increased intelligence capabilities coupled with force modernization and leveraging state of the art and forthcoming technologies will provide the warning to deter and defeat these threats.

DOD can significantly enhance the capabilities of U.S. civilian government organizations to respond to the terrorist WMD threat by working and training with agencies such as: FEMA, DOE, CIA, DIA, the FBI, and the Department of State. In some cases, military organizations have already developed contingency plans to execute preemptive strikes against terrorist

threats.⁸⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Any policy developed to combat terrorist use of WMD must address the psychological, political, economic and military aspects of national strategy and the integration of current and future technology.

Psychological

The U.S. policy must attack the problem in such a manner that WMD use is rendered unthinkable. Education on the results of the use of such weapons is paramount. However, just as education on the hazards of tobacco smoking has not eradicated smoking, there must be a "hook" that is easily understood and accurately and graphically depicts the fate of those who use such weapons. The potential user of WMD must believe that the consequence of such action will be unbearable—the goal is not worth the risk. Our response must be credible and overwhelming. The American people must be prepared, through open debate, on what our response will be and why it will be so overwhelming.

Political

A critical component of any policy will always remain the pursuit of nonproliferation agreements and the subsequent penalties for those proliferating WMD. The U.S. must remain engaged in the diplomatic process to counter the proliferation of WMD. Current agreements are worth improving, implementing, enforcing and pursuing. Key factors in this process will be the implementation of the National Coordinator position for nonproliferation in the NSC, and developing procedures for enforceable inspection and verification. The National Coordinator position should be implemented immediately and responsibilities should include stronger WMD agreements and developing strategy countering terrorist WMD use.

In conjunction with the Mid-East dual containment policy, additional agreements need to be implemented to improve information exchange between the intelligence services of the countries that are concerned with preventing terrorism and the spread of WMD. The U.S. also needs to increase its efforts to develop credible HUMINT sources.

Finally, the terrorist use of WMD should be dealt with as an act of war. This will allow the U.S. the full use of its considerable power and legitimize the option of proactive, surgical, preemptive strikes. This also requires educating the American people and an extensive effort to build nonproliferation coalitions. Additionally, the U.S. must be prepared to act unilaterally to protect our interests. As the most powerful nation in the world, we must be prepared to use that power not just for our own well being, but for the greater good of all mankind.

Military & Intelligence

Military forces are continuously involved countering terrorism worldwide. Many of the tactics, techniques and procedures that the military uses to reduce the threat of WMD are applicable to the development of strategy to defeat terrorist use of these weapons. The military possesses the most highly trained units to counter the effects of WMD. These units should be part of the strategy to provide training to local, state and federal authorities in recognizing this threat and how to deal with it.

To improve domestic capabilities, the bureaucracy needs to be streamlined which injects Army special units into an incident. Training dollars need to be increased and the various military organizations and federal agencies need to have better access to each other and local authorities. Recurring training exercises should be conducted involving all organizations involved in counterterrorism.

A centralized coordination center for command and control and intelligence should be established. This headquarters will be the terminal for all intelligence, and activities countering terrorist use of WMD, domestically and overseas.

Nuclear and chemical weapons can substitute for a large conventional force structure. This restructured force, modernized and highly trained must be capable of conducting missions throughout the spectrum of war, with significant resources capable of dealing with terrorists and WMD effects in peace and war.

Economic

New laws for the U.S. should be enacted prohibiting donations to organizations with ties to terrorism.

Appropriate foreign aid must be provided to states such as the FSU to forestall WMD proliferation. Certification processes and incentives should be used to determine how much and who receives this aid.

Technological Tools

Chaos theory may permit the development of models that can offer reliable predictions of terrorist intentions and its use should be explored. Additionally, the information explosion and continual technological breakthroughs enable possibilities that just were not possible in the past. Punctilious attention must be given to studying new sciences and technologies that may be pertinent in the fight against proliferation and terrorism.

Other technology designed specifically for personnel and force protection, WMD device detection and deactivation in support of CT forces should continue to be pursued. This includes better body armor, remote/lightweight detection devices, more versatile communications equipment, enhanced limited visibility devices, etc.

SUMMARY

The United States is facing a threat of unparalleled dimensions. It must posture itself with a clear, concise and comprehensive policy dealing with terrorist use of WMD against the United States, our interests and allies. This policy must be both proactive and defensive in nature while covering all aspects of political, military, economic and psychological deterrence. Both counterterrorism initiatives—offensive action—and antiterrorism initiatives—defensive actions—need to be incorporated into this policy.

While we can study the past in order to prevent the repetition of mistakes gone by; as noted by numerous authorities, it is impossible to use the past to accurately predict the future in the arena of terrorism. The combination of WMD and terrorists is so lethal that we cannot afford to allow a mistake in judgment to occur. Our policy must be strong and vibrant and affirm that terrorist use of WMD will result in unacceptable consequences to those using such weapons.

Rational actors, such as the former USSR we understood and found to be predictable. Today we deal with religious, doomsday and outright fringe, lunatic elements who by no measurable means can be considered rational.

Our problem is that one man's rationality is another man's psychosis. The true believers in the religious extremist groups may not be constrained by "public opinion or a change in policy of an adversary. Additionally, "being killed while undertaking an act of terrorism may [lead] to paradise in the next life."⁸⁷ Understanding these groups may be impossible as their rationality is so alien to our culture.

The U.S. counter/antiterrorist program must be constructed and prepared to deal with the unthinkable, a terrorist attack using WMD in the U.S., to preclude the American people and government from being unprepared and able only to exact revenge.

“But I'll never forget till the day I die...

How amazement leapt into every eye,

Then fury and grief and pain.

... “O dearly, dearly avenged you'll be

Or ever a day be sped!”⁸⁸

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